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'The implication is obvious: to achieve his national and popular goals, the Prince must start out by respecting the 
people’s ideology, even – especially – if he wants to transform it. He must take care that every political act, each 
form of political practice, intervenes and resonates as a matter of fact in the element of this ideology. He must 
therefore take charge of it, accept responsibility for the ideological effects of his own political practice, anticipate 
them, and inscribe them in it. And since the Prince is literally the public face of the state, he must take care that the 
people’s representation of his figure is inscribed in popular ideology, so as to produce effects beneficial to his 
politics' (p. 97).
Althusser's robust conception of ideology and hegemony make for this interesting interpretation of the Prince's role 
in politics. It is also a clear statement of the pragmatic aims of Machiavelli's ouvre. Althusser's popular position 
shines through most clearly in this statement, with Machiavelli's work no longer being a tyranny or satire, but 
instead a popular government of the People in the name of the People - the suppression of the class struggle through 
the Prince's person. The political leader is responsible and accountable to the people, and his own person inscribed 
in popular discourse. This somewhat negates the cold cruelty and ends-justify-the-means that is often ascribed to 
Machiavelli generally and The Princespecifically. 
This conclusion is perhaps a pragmatic concession, but definitely an important one. The gem that is present in this 
book flows from the above quotiations - that of the popular prince as responsible to people as the person of the 
national State. A much more fascinating interpretation of a political theorist than is offered in the philosophical 
historiography of Machiavelli, this book is well worth reading and certainly a must read for anyone interested in 
political philosophy in general and Machiavelli's contribution to philosophy specifically.
Althusser's central thesis is that 'Machiavelli’s New Prince is thus a specific political form charged with executing 
the historical demands ‘on the agenda’: the constitution of a nation' (p. 13). He contends that Machiavelli is neither a 
Monarchist, apologist for tyranny nor a closet republican. Instead, Machiavelli is a philosopher of the nation-state, 
and The Prince 'is the formulation of a concrete political problem' (p. 16), a problem only a strong ruler can solve. 
But that would not capture the nuance of Althusser's argument.
Althusser presents a picture of Machiavelli in contradiction to the two major streams of interpretation - though, by 
his own admission, it is not strictly an interpretation. The work is not especially dense and gives a good outline of 
The Prince and the Discourses. For anyone looking for an introduction to Machiavelli's work, and more loosely an 
introduction to Marxist politics, one need look no further. That said, the last essay is more or less a restatement of 
the first 120 pages, and can be skipped without losing much of the content.
The main thesis, which is built from the beginning and does not take a clear shape until the very end, is that 
Machiavelli is one of the greatest, if not the greatest materialist philosopher in history. Throughout the book, 
Althusser rejects the Gramscian charge of utopianism and draws a picture of a \"fragmented\" philosophy, which we 
can reason to be the only possible materialist philosophy in charge of a political objective. Of note are Althusser's 
handling of spatial metaphors and his foreshadowing of the theoretical dispositive. 
The encounter in question is that of the two great entities of Renaissance political ontology, fortuna and virtù. Italian 
humanists were agreed on the power of chance in worldly affairs, the essential fickleness of ʻfortuneʼ. In this they 
were already anti-teleologi- cal, attracting criticism from those who continued to uphold Augustineʼs providentialist 
understanding of human destiny. However, their standard assump- tion was that goodness would be rewarded by cir- 
cumstance, that the steady practice of public virtù would tend to moderate fortuna; and in this way, their thinking 
was itself providentialist. Machiavelli made no such assumption. For him, the blessings of chance were as temporary 
as its blights were lasting. Political outcomes were settled in the variable encoun- ters of fortuna and virtù; desired 
outcomes emerged from the adequate exercise of the latter in the given conditions. The reality of those conditions, 
including their horizon of possibility, would disclose itself only to ʻexperimentalʼ inquiry involving careful 
historical comparison (with the Roman Republic, for example, or, closer in time, the career of Cesare Borgia). And 
virtù, the cardinal value in public affairs, was not reducible to ʻvirtueʼ. Here, for Althusser, is the moment of the 
break.
This Machiavelli is the pioneering theorist of ʻthe conjunctureʼ. In two senses: he acknowledges the oper- ation of 
general ʻlawsʼ but does not centrally concern himself with them, knowing that they do not account for specific 
historical situations and their possible outcomes; and his practice of writing itself observes the discipline of one such 
situation and its political tasks, thus taking the form of a ʻmanifestoʼ. The Prince is recognizable in this account, 
even though the pages given to Machiavelliʼs philosophical reasoning seem wilfully over-complicated, and at times 
mistaken. It is tempting to say that this lengthy treatment of his theoretical ʻdispositiveʼ (dispositif) is itself a literary 
ʻdeviceʼ (one of the meanings of the French term) by which Althusser has Machiavelli illustrate, in his own writing 
procedure, the form of his substantive political recommendations. However, the theoretical heart of this discussion is 
the familiar concept of ʻconjunctureʼ – familiar to any reader of Althusser,
The Prince seems, as it were, to filter the strong, Althusserian concept of conjuncture, retaining only the pure liquor 
of ʻsituationsʼ – the ʻconjuncturalʼ in Gramsciʼs strictly limited, because contrastive, sense. Structures can thus be 
discounted as the inert ground of agency, whose vital element is alea. This, in a putative last distillation, would be 
the metaphysics of voluntarism. Historical uncertainty and openness are the ordinary work of structured, structuring 
processes, not a primordial counter-force called ʻchanceʼ: this was the apparent lesson of ʻContradiction and Over- 
determinationʼ (which, indeed, Althusser wrote not long after his first lectures on Machiavelli). But in that text too, 
it must be said, there were signs of theoreti- cal instability – notably in the perverse declaration that ʻthe last instance 
never comesʼ. This Renaissance looking-glass only magnifies them.
Mastery of conjunctures depends on virtù, the crucial concept in this as in any evaluation of Machia- velli. The term 
as he uses it resists economical trans- lation, above all because ʻvirtueʼ, the literal rendering, is strictly unavailable. 
We now enter the shadow of Old Nick – or, as Althusser would say, continuing the long line of his admirers, the 
light of Machiavelliʼs ʻscience of politicsʼ. Virtù, which encompasses ʻthe subjective conditionsʼ of political 
capability, is an indispensable positive value that cannot be rewritten as a compound of personal or even civic 
virtues. That is Machia- velliʼs fundamental proposition. It is not an argument for amoralism: he acknowledges the 
moral reality of right and wrong and agrees that right is preferable. It is not an argument for pragmatism, which, in 
perfect consistency, he views as a tactical instrument, not a principle. ʻThe Prince can be judged by only one 
criterion: successʼ, Althusser writes, but the meaning of ʻsuccessʼ is given by the nature of the historical task. ʻThe 
result alone countsʼ, he continues: ʻbut the goal is the sole arbiter of the result that counts.ʼ In this fine epigram, 
Althusser encapsulates his sense of Machiavelliʼs importance, as the originator of a discourse on values that are not 
of the same order as the virtues, on a form of practical reason that is neither moralistic nor mere calculus – a 
discourse on the specificity of politics.
Neither Althusser nor Gramsci could have read The Prince as they did without the contextual presence of Lenin. But 
no one can simply unwrite such charac- teristically modern exercises in tradition – nor should anyone on the Left be 
too quick to try. Machiavelli has been recalled as a contemporary, and not without good reason. Any current reader 
of this journal of socialist and feminist philosophers has lived through all or part of a historic reversal; no one has 
been unaf- fected; many have worked to further the change. Over the past thirty-odd years, there has been a 
widespread conversion of sensibility on the radical Left, which, for now, might pointedly be captioned ʻthe rise of 
the anti-Machiavellian principleʼ. The gist of this principle is that the forms of organization and practice of the Left 
should be embodiments of its animating social values, instantiations of its ends – in other words, that emancipatory 
virtù is virtue militant. The Machiavel- lian reprise is not that this is undesirable, or merely sentimental, but that it is 
self-contradictory. Politics is a specific and therefore (conditionally) autonomous form of social practice with a 
specific object – the maintenance or transformation of the ensemble of social relations in a given space – and 
specific norms of judgement, which are not reducible to the order of the moral. In an Althusserian term that 
Althusser might usefully have mobilized for his commentary, political practice is non-expressive in structure: virtù 
cannot simply and sufficiently embody any ʻvirtueʼ, including the ones for which it fights. Here, for all his historical 
remoteness, as distastefully as ever, Althus- serʼs Machiavelli speaks to us.
Mastery of conjunctures depends on virtù, the crucial concept in this as in any evaluation of Machia- velli. The term 
as he uses it resists economical trans- lation, above all because ʻvirtueʼ, the literal rendering, is strictly unavailable. 
We now enter the shadow of Old Nick – or, as Althusser would say, continuing the long line of his admirers, the 
light of Machiavelliʼs ʻscience of politicsʼ. Virtù, which encompasses ʻthe subjective conditionsʼ of political 
capability, is an indispensable positive value that cannot be rewritten as a compound of personal or even civic 
virtues. That is Machia- velliʼs fundamental proposition. It is not an argument for amoralism: he acknowledges the 
moral reality of right and wrong and agrees that right is preferable. It is not an argument for pragmatism, which, in 
perfect consistency, he views as a tactical instrument, not a principle. ʻThe Prince can be judged by only one 
criterion: successʼ, Althusser writes, but the meaning of ʻsuccessʼ is given by the nature of the historical task. ʻThe 
result alone countsʼ, he continues: ʻbut the goal is the sole arbiter of the result that counts.ʼ In this fine epigram, 
Althusser encapsulates his sense of Machiavelliʼs importance, as the originator of a discourse on values that are not 
of the same order as the virtues, on a form of practical reason that is neither moralistic nor mere calculus – a 
discourse on the specificity of politics.
It is debatable whether we actually ʻneedʼ the example of Machiavelli.
Beginning – the philosophy and politics of a departure without precedent or guarantee – is the leitmotiv of this book, 
and readers do well to start just there. Althusserʼs title is one of those in which, as Adorno said of Romeo and Juliet, 
the conjunction is every- thing. The reading it announces and enjoins upon ʻusʼ involves another ʻreturnʼ – this time, 
to Machiavelli.
Students of early modern political thought will recognize the interpretive issues at the centre of the discussion. How, 
if at all, can the ʻmonarchistʼ Prince be reconciled with the ʻrepublicanʼ Discourses on Livy? What is the 
relationship between political virtù and moral virtue? These are perennial topics. Readers of Quentin Skinner and his 
co-thinkers will be quick to lay the charge of romanticizing ʻanachronismʼ: the ʻandʼ of the title can only be 
disjunctive, surely. Niccolò Machiavelli was not the heroic solitary of Althusserʼs depiction. His preference for a 
ʻcompositeʼ form of republican government, combining elements of mon- archy, oligarchy and democracy, was 
unremarkable at the time, even if distinguished in its bias against the aristocratic interest. In his preoccupation with 
merce- naries as enemies of dependable military organization, he reiterated a commonplace of Florentine republican 
thinking. Seen in a context that included numerous works of the same kind, some bearing the same title, The Prince 
is not quite the ʻmodernʼ foundling of modern legend. But Althusser would not have been discouraged. His own 
interpretive tradition – that of Hegel, De Sanctis and Gramsci – values Machiavelli in a positively anachronizing 
spirit, for his ʻactualityʼ. He ʻgripsʼ us, Althusser declares; there is something uncanny in his thought, for readers 
who come to recognize in it ʻthe true nature of the battle they were wagingʼ. He asks us here to read ʻin the mirror of 
Machiavelliʼ.
Althusserʼs Machiavelli is the strategist of an origi- nal historical project, and the original theorist of political 
practice. The project, as Gramsci and his forerunners had maintained, is Italian national unity. Althusser concurs, 
while emphasizing the most general historical meaning of the goal, and, in turn, its most general defining attributes.
